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In conclusion, it is submitted that the felony murder doctrine
in Kentucky is based on the same principles as the negligent murder
doctrine, since to convict a defendant of murder for a death occuring
during the commission of a felony there must first be a felony
dangerous to life and, secondly, the death of the victim must be the
necessary or natural consequence of the felony.
J. GRiANVILLE CLARK

CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY AND THE FELONY MURDER
DOCTRINE IN KENTUCKY*
Defendant was indicted jointly with two others for the crime of
wilful murder by setting fire to a house and burning a child to death.
The evidence showed that defendant was not near enough to aid and
abet in the crime. Conviction was accordingly obtained under an
instruction on conspiracy. Defendant appealed contending, inter aZia,
that the court erred in not submitting to the jury the question of
whether the killing of the child was the natural and probable consequence of the burning of the house and therefore within the purpose of
the conspiracy. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding
that there was no doubt that the death of the child was the natural consequence of burning the house; and that therefore it was not necessary
for the conspiracy instruction to submit this question for the determination of the jury. Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 111, 128
S.W. (2d) 208 (1939).
According to the modern conception of the felony murder doctrine,
a conviction of murder will be sustained when a homicide occurs at
the hands of the felon during the perpetration of a felony such as
arson, robbery, rape, burglary, or Other felony which involves a substantial risk to human life.' Whether the homicide was a natural and
probable consequence 2 of the commission of the felony Is seldom considered by the courts.
A summary investigation of the instant case might lead one to
conclude that Kentucky has modified the felony murder doctrine and
now permits a conviction of murder only when the homicide Is the
natural and probable consequence of the perpekration of the particular
3
felony. In order to ascertain the truth or falsity of that conclusion
it will be necessary to review briefly the Kentucky decisions relating to
felony murder.
* This comment is written in conjunction with the one immediately
preceding. The same case is considered in both. The writers reach
different conclusions.-Ed.
I See Arent & MacDonald, The Felony Murder Doctrine and Its
Application Under the New York Statutes (1935) 20 Cornell L. Q. 288,
291; 2 Note (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 218.
Notes (1940) 28 Ky. L. J. 215, 216; 28 Ky. L. J. 218, 221 n. 11.
See also Arent & MacDonald, supra n. 1, at 309.
3See Companion Note (1940) 29 Ky. L. J. 197.
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4
In Commonwealth v. Reddick, the first reported Kentucky case
dealing directly with homicide in the commission of a felony, no
mention was made of a requirement that the homicide be a natural
and probable consequence of the commission of the felony. On the
contrary, the court indicated that the consequences of the commission
of the felony are held; as a matter of law, to be natural and probable.
6
Williams v. Commonwealth, a recent Kentucky decision, reiterated
the holding of the Readick case, and again no mention was made of a
necessity for the ]-rsence of natural and probable causation. In answer
to a request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction, the court very
aptly observed:

"We are not aware of having approved a ... voluntary manslaughter instruction where the homicide was committed while
the accused was attempting to commit or was committing a felony,
such as robbery, which tends to the injury of another ... Where
the killing is under those circumstances, it is murder."
8
Judge Roberson, a noted authority on Kentucky criminal law,
accords with this view, and suggests that it is murder even though
the felon accidentallykills his victim. He brings no element of natural
snd probable causation into the crime. The great majority of American jurisdictions are in accord with the Kentucky view as expressed
by Judge Roberson.'
The opinion in the instant case is, therefore, apparently in conflit with both Kentucky and general American precedent insofar as
it suggests that natural and probable causation is a factor to be
considered in felony murder. However, since the court does not
expressly repudiate such precedent, an approach from a different standpoint might reconcile the cas& with past precedent. This different

'17 Ky. Law Rep. 1020, 33 S.W. 416 (1895).
5 "The felonious intent and purpose of accused in doing which, if
guilty, the law certainly transfers to a consequence and result of same
so natural as that the inmates of the house might by such fire lose
their lives. Upon such a state of case we think there has never been
any doubt as to the law." Id. at 417.
8258 Ky. 830, 81 S.W. (2d) 891 (1935).
at 834, S.W. at 893.
1Id.
8
R oberson, New Kentucky Criminal Law and Procedure, (2d ed.
1927) sec. 357: "It follows therefore, that all homicide committed or
caused by one engaged in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate
rape, arson, burglary, or robbery, or other felony, is murder . . . It is
therefore murder if a robber accidentally kills his victim, or if a person
commits arson by setting fire to a dwelling house, and accidentally
burns the occupant."
I upra, n. 2. In a few American jurisdictions the perpetration of
the felony must be the natural and probable cause of the death before
a murder conviction will be sustained. Turk v. State, 48 Ohio App.
489, 194 N.E. 425 (1934); 'Pleimling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 1 N.W. 278
Other jurisdictions merely repeat their statutory provisions,
(1879).
and no reference is made to any requirement of natural and probable
causation. See Arent & MacDonald, supra, n. 1 at 294 for a summary
of the various statutory provisions.
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approach must proceed from the conspiracy factor in the instant
case.
The common law crime of conspiracy has been held to be com0
And the co-conspirapleted in a bare unexecuted agreement to do evil.
tors are held responsible for all acts which are the natural and prob1
The
able result of the original unlawful purpose of the conspiracy.
acts for which the co-conspirators may be responsible may occur when
the co-conspirator is not present at the scene of the occurrence. Thus
it is no more than reasonable that liability should attach to the
co-conspirator only where the act is the natural and probable consequence of te purpose of the conspiracy. Otherwise, the conspiracy
iule would permit one person to be held accountable for an accident,
wholly unrelated to the conspiracy, where this accident occurred at
the hands of another individual.
No exception to the rule requiring natural and probable causation
is found where -the purpose of the conspiracy was to commit a dangerous felony. In Commonwealth v. Walters," a Kentucky case, the
court held that where a felony is conspired, the co-conspirators are
guilty of murder only where the killing is the natural and probable
consequence of the conspiracy. Although the felony was statutory
(conspiracy to effect a break from prison) it was a felony involving
substantial risk to human life and should be subject to the same rules
which apply to similarly dangerous common law felonies."
Again, in Tincher v. Commonzvealth,"4 the Kentucky court, in
effect, concluded that in cases involving death in a conspiracy to
commit a felony the death must have been the natural and probable
consequence of an act within the purpose of the conspiracy before a
conspirator may be convicted of murder. In that case, G and defendant,
with others, conspired to rob a bank. During the course of the robbery, G pointed a gun toward deceased to "hold him up". The gun was
-discharged. The court made the following observation:
"...
it is argued that the court should have instructed the jury
on accidental shooting, and upon the reckless handling of firearms
by (G), resulting in the shooting . . . We concede that it would
"Com. v. Fuller, 132 Mass. 563 (1882); Com. v. Bartilson, 85 Pa.
St. 482 (1877); Rex. v. Gill, 2 B. & Ald. 204, 106 Eng. Rep. 341 (1818).
"Kentucky has held, in accordance with that rule, that where a
homicide is committed by one conspirator in the course of the conspiracy all of the co-conspirators are equally liable provided the killing
is a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. Powers v.
Com., 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735 (1901). The court gives a thorough
analysis of the Jaw of conspiracy with relation to resulting homicides.
S.W. at 743. See also Roberson, supra n. 7 at sec. 224.
2206 Ky. 162, 266 S.W. 1066 (1924).
"3Judge Roberson states that Kentucky does not recognize a distinction between statutory and common law felonies in the application
of the felony murder doctrine. Roberson, supra n. 7 at sec. 357. See
also Powers v. Com., 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735, 742 (1901) (Kentucky
would apply the doctrine only to those statutory and common law
felonies which involve a substantial risk to human life).
'1253 Ky. 623, 69 S.W. (2d) 750 (1934).
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have been proper, if there had been any evidence establishing either
of such theories, to have instructed the jury thereon, and it would
have been prejudicial error not to have done so.'
(Italics added)
The court clearly indicates that natural and probable causation must
exist before the conspirator may be convicted of murder. Obviously,
an instruction requiring such causation would not have been proper
if the conspirator is to be treated in the same manner as the ordinary
felon of the Reddiclk and Williams cases. In those cases, as has been
pointed out above, natural and probable causation was not a factor
deemed worthy of consideration. However, the Reddicc and Williams
cases involved only the felony murder doctrine, and no conspiracy
factor was present. Apparently the court makes a distinction between
the felony murder doctrine and the conspiracy to commit a felony. The
felon under application of the felony murder doctrine is guilty of
murder without regard to natural and probable causation. However,
the conspirator in the conspiracy to commit a felony is guilty of
murder only when the resulting homicide is the natural and probable
consequence of the conspiracy. 0 Thus the distinction between the
felony murder doctrine and the conspiracy to commit a felony rests
upon the conspicuous unimportance of natural and probable causation
in the former in contrast to the obvious necessity for such causation
In the latter.
In view of the fact that the instant case involves a conspiracy to
commit a felony, and not the felony murder doctrine, we must conclude that the decision of the court was correct and not opposed to
established precedent in Kentucky. Except for the fact that this
homicide was without question the natural and probable consequence of
the conspiracy to commit arson, the defendant would have been entitled
to have the question of natural and probable causation submitted to the
jury. Since the defendant was a conspirator absent from the scene of
the crime, he cannot be held for murder unless the homicide was the
natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. If the defendant
had committed the homicide himself while in the actual perpetration
of the felony, the felony murder doctrine would be applicable and he
could be held for murder without reference to natural and probable
causation.
' Id. at 628, S.W. at 753.
'0 Kentucky Is not alone in recognizing the distinction between the
felony murder doctrine and the conspiracy to commit a felony. People
v. Jones, Cal. -, 29 P. (2d) 902 (1934) holds that natural and
probable causation must be present in a conspiracy to commit a felony
before a co-conspirator may be convicted of murder; while People v.
Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 78 Pac. 549 (1904) indicates that the felony
murder doctrine will be invoked without reference to natural and
probable causation. See Arent & MacDonald, supra n. 1 at 305-10 for
a discussion of the distinction as it exists in New York and other
jurisdictions. Arent & MacDonald recognize that natural and probable
causation must be present in a conspiracy to commit a felony, but
doubt that it should be required in view of the fact that the felony
murder doctrine does not require such causation.
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The language and references of the court in the instant case
clearly indicate that there was no intention to depart from the accepted
conception of felony murder. Reference was made to Judge Roberson's
treatise on criminal law, and a clear felony murder concept was quoted
therefrom:
"It is murder . . . if a person commits arson by setting fire to a
dwelling house and accidentally burns the occupant." 17 (Italics
added).
The court also referred to Reddick v. Commonwealth, which, as pointed
out above, is in conformity with the accepted theory of felony murder.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the instant case is not a departure from the generally recognized felony murder doctrine. The conspiracy factor, and that alone, rendered it necessary for the court to
include the theory of natural and probable causation before the conviction of murder could be sustained. Also, a reiteration of the longstanding Kentucky precedent makes it evident that a departure from
this precedent was not intended.
J. Wiar Tun-En, J.
TRIAL PROCEDURE-DOES A MOTION FOR PEREMPTORY
INSTRUCTION TEST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
PLEADING?
In an action for injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of
the defendant, defendant pleaded contributory negligence, and filed a
counterclaim for his injuries. These allegations were not controverted
by the plaintiff's reply. The defendant's motions for peremptory instructions, made at the close of the plaintiff's evidence, and again at
the close of all the proof, were denied. The defendant asks reversal
of the judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that his affirmative
defense went undenied. The Court of Appeals said:
"We have ruled in actions ex contractu and in suits of equity
that a party waives the failure to traverse an affirmative allegation
where the case was tried as if the issue had been joined in the
pleading, but in tort actions the rule is otherwise."
The Court reversed the judgment but aflowed the plaintiff to file a
reply controverting the allegations if he desired to have a new trial.
Short v. Robinson, - Ky. -, 134 S.W. (2d) 595 (1939).
The statement of the Court that there is a distinction between
these three classes of actions, contract equity, and tort, must be considered in the light of the facts of the case before it. Should the court
follow this dictum, it would necessarily hold that a motion for peremptory instruction in contract and equity actions will not raise
the sufficiency of the pleadings, but in tort actions the rule is other'wise. Such a rule is not supported by law.
In a search for authority upon which the Kentucky Court could
base such a holding the only case found is Glens Falls Insurance Co. v.
1Whitfield v. Com., 278 Ky. 111, 116, 128 S.W. (2d) 208, 210-11
(1939).

